Abstract: This paper compares retail and wholesale electricity prices in SEM, the market of the island of Ireland, and BETTA in Great Britain. Estimated wholesale costs are much lower in BETTA. We show that this is mostly because the wholesale price in BETTA is set too low to cover generation costs, although it is compensated by large retail margins. The need for substantial new investment in generation in Great Britain suggests that returns to generators will have to increase. This should be accompanied by a decrease in retail margins to avoid overburdening final consumers. Renewable support in Great Britain appears very expensive when compared to Ireland.
Introduction
This paper investigates the price of electricity in Ireland and Great Britain 1 , two very different markets. We compare both wholesale and retail prices during the 2008-2011 period and suggest structural, technological and regulatory characteristics that explain the price differences. We determine how these differences are likely to affect future electricity prices, a worthwhile effort in light of the move towards more renewables and the EU's attempt to integrate electricity markets through the Target Model.
Since the end of 2007 Northern Ireland and Ireland have shared a wholesale electricity market, here referred to as the Single Electricity Market (SEM). The two regulators on the island (the Northern Ireland Utility Regulator and the Commission for Energy regulation, CER) cooperate to regulate the wholesale market through the SEM committee. The SEM has strict rules and is tightly monitored, thereby limiting generators' opportunities to exploit market power.
Great Britain (GB) and Northern Ireland, as regions of the United Kingdom (UK), share similar and interrelated schemes to encourage renewable electricity generation: the Renewable Obligation 1 In this paper we refer to the Republic of Ireland as "Ireland". When addressing Ireland and Northern Ireland as a single entity we refer to the island of Ireland. We use Great Britain (GB) to distinguish that part of the UK from Northern Ireland, also part of the UK. While both Northern Ireland and GB are regions of the UK, they have separate regulators: the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) and the Utility Regulator, respectively.
Certificates (ROCs) and the Northern Ireland ROCs respectively. In Ireland support for renewables is provided by a different mechanism -a feed in tariff (REFIT).
Great Britain faces an uncertain future with respect to electricity prices. Most existing nuclear plants are due to close around the end of the decade and much coal-fired capacity will also close in 2016 as a result of the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive. It is not clear how this obsolete plant portfolio will be replaced and there are concerns that prospective returns from investment under the current market rules may not result in adequate investment (Helm, 2009 ).
We use information from the transparent market in Ireland to build a benchmark against which to compare market outcomes in Britain. Giulietti et al. (2010) show that the move to a market based on bilateral contracts in GB, combined with other changes in market structure, saw a squeezing of wholesale margins, with profitability being enhanced at the retail end. We confirm these findings and suggest that existing retail margins are generally sufficient to compensate for the lower wholesale prices.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we examine retail electricity prices in Ireland and GB over the past 30 years. We then compare historical wholesale prices in the two markets in Section 3.
Since there is no single official wholesale electricity price for Great Britain, we discuss two estimates of its wholesale price. To measure the cost of generation in the GB market (BETTA), we build a model of BETTA that provides a lower bound for its historical generation costs. Using the same model and imposing identical fuel input prices in BETTA and SEM, we determine how much of the difference between wholesale prices is due to differences in generation technology. Section 4 examines domestic retail prices in detail and discusses some of the drivers of retail margins. Section 5 discusses the likely trend in future prices given our findings and Section 6 concludes.
History
Over the last 30 years retail electricity prices have generally been higher in Ireland than in the UK. faced by industry and households in Ireland and GB in nominal euro. These data are taken from the International Energy Agency publication Energy Prices and Taxes, the only source that provides prices back to the 1970s on a consistent basis. To convert the GB prices to euro we use average yearly exchange rates published by Eurostat.
The gap between prices was particularly big in the 1980s, especially for the household sector. This reflected the need in Ireland to fund major investment in the main coal-fuelled generating station. By 3 the end of the 1990s that station had largely been paid for and investment in Ireland was at a low level. Until the late 1990s the state-owned utility, the Electricity Supply Board (ESB), had total responsibility for the sector in Ireland. Over the period 1980-2000, prices were generally based on the average cost of electricity generation. When investment was undertaken this resulted in high prices and when there was a lull in investment the assets were "sweated", with prices falling below long run marginal cost. This approach to pricing was common in regulated utilities (Helm 2004) , although it is a suboptimal approach from a wider economic efficiency point of view.
By contrast, in Great Britain following privatisation of the industry and the breakup of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) monopoly in the early 1990s, there was substantial excess capacity. The transmission and distribution infrastructure was already fully developed and growth in the UK economy in the subsequent period did not result in a major increase in demand. The advent of new more efficient technology using natural gas (combined with low gas prices) saw a "dash for gas" in the 1990s, which further increased capacity. When this resulted in a major drop in utilisation of existing coal-fired plants, which were already fully depreciated, this spare capacity was moth-balled rather than decommissioned. There has consequently been no need for major new investment in generating capacity over the past decade. The result of this excess capacity has been that, over time, electricity prices in the British market did not reflect the long run marginal cost of producing electricity. Given costs sunk in excess generating capacity, generators competed for market share on the basis of short run marginal costs.
Electricity prices in Ireland and GB were also affected by the movement in energy prices. The fall in oil prices and the low gas price in Ireland in the 1990s drove the cost of electricity in Ireland down.
The result of the fall in average capital costs and the change in relative prices of fuels meant that in the late 1990s, for a short period, prices in Ireland actually fell below those in GB. However, the rapid rise in gas prices (relative to coal) since 2000, combined with the necessary shift to pricing at long run marginal cost, has seen a substantial wedge open up between Irish and British prices, especially for industrial users.
Wholesale prices
Comparing wholesale prices in the two systems is not straightforward. The SEM is a mandatory pool market with capacity payments. Wholesale prices for SEM are the sum of the System Marginal Price (SMP), which reflects the marginal cost of generating electricity in the short run, and capacity payments, designed to compensate for the capital cost of building new generation. Capacity payments are allocated on a half-hourly basis, and are larger when the gap between available generation capacity and consumption of electricity is smaller. The SMP and capacity payments for SEM are published by the system operator SEMO (www.sem-o.com) for every half hour. The transparency of the market design facilitates monitoring and evidence indicates that firms have priced at short-run marginal cost (Market Monitoring Unit, 2009; Gorecki, 2013) . Lyons et al. (2007) showed that the SEM incentivises investment in new generation without rewarding new generators excessively.
It is more difficult to obtain data for the British system. BETTA is an energy-only market and is designed to encourage bilateral trading, for which there is no public information. Most of the transactions take place within vertically integrated firms. The system operator is in charge of the balancing market, which does not provide a unique price signal: there is a buy and a sell price and generators can be on either side of the buy/sell relation. 3 We use data from Elexon (elexon.co.uk) to determine the balancing or spot price. There are several power exchanges in the BETTA market, each potentially giving rise to a different price. In this study we use data from the APX exchange for electricity futures prices, as it is available for the whole period we cover: 2008 -2011. The balancing market represents only 1 per cent of total electricity demand, although Bunn and Zachmann (2010) suggest that balancing prices are in line with over-the-counter prices, which account for a further 9 per cent of total volume.
We use two measures of the British wholesale price: the spot market price and a price based on18 month hedged prices. The spot price is calculated from balancing data published by the system operator. 4 The balancing price is the best available measure of the spot price, but it is not a perfect indicator (see Ofgem, 2013 , Appendix 1). The 18-month hedge price is built following the methodology presented in Ofgem (2009b) , assuming that generators enter into forward contracts with suppliers and sell their power starting 18 months ahead of the generating period, selling a residual 10 per cent at the spot price. Specifically, we calculate a hedged price per quarter assuming that companies sell 15 per cent of their output in each of the prior 6 quarters and obtain the going forward price at the time. To obtain the annual price we take a weighted average of the quarterly hedged price, where the weights are determined by consumption during the quarter. The price generators obtain for electricity at time t therefore depends in part on the forward price established 18 months prior to t.
BETTA does not feature capacity payments, so generators must recover their long run costs through the energy prices. We therefore compare the sum of SMP and capacity payments in SEM to energy market prices in BETTA. Table 1 reports the prices for all years, transformed into euro.
SEM prices are closely tied to spot fuel and carbon dioxide permit prices, as generators are expected to bid on the basis of these input costs. The strong drop in oil and natural gas prices that occurred in February 2009 translated into lower spot prices in both jurisdictions. Not surprisingly it took a bit longer to emerge in the hedged prices series. In general, however, BETTA prices appear lower than SEM prices. There are several potential drivers of this result. In section 3.2 we consider whether British wholesale prices might actually be too low, in the sense that they are not sufficient to cover long run marginal costs. British prices could also be lower because of a different portfolio of plants.
We examine this option in Section 3.3. Before addressing the findings of our simulations, section 3.1 describes the model for BETTA.
The Model
The electricity market model is constructed with PLEXOS. 5 The PLEXOS modelling tool is used by the CER and the Utility Regulator to validate the Single Electricity Market and has a history of use in Ireland (Commission for Energy Regulation and Utility Regulator 2011). PLEXOS optimises hydro, thermal, renewable and reserves simultaneously. Modelling is carried out using mixed integer linear programming that minimises the cost of generation, including fuel, carbon and start-up costs, while meeting generating plants' technical constraints. PLEXOS reports the shadow price and the uplift for each period. The shadow price can be interpreted as the marginal price of electricity generation or, in other words, the cost incurred to match an incremental change in demand. Any additional fixed and start-up costs are remunerated through the uplift factor.
The British model is based on the version built in Deane et al. (2013) The size of the capacity pot is somewhat sensitive to availability and forced outage assumptions. If plant availability were set lower, capacity payments would be higher. As we note later, reasonable variations in capacity payments for BETTA do not significantly affect our conclusions. Although the simulation results are necessarily approximations, our findings provide evidence that the British wholesale market might be underpricing electricity. The GB market might encounter difficulties securing replacements for the generating capacity to be retired over the coming decade (Helm, 2009 ). We discuss this in more detail in Section 5. The low LRMC does not mean that current generators are making losses. The industry is dominated by vertically integrated utilities, so profitability should be assessed across the range of activities undertaken by these firms. Integrated energy utilities, while not receiving adequate remuneration from the wholesale market, derive exceptional profits from their retail operations, which could incentivise new investment (Giulietti et al.¸2010) . We explore retail prices further in Section 4.
BETTA and long run marginal costs

The impact of technology differences
To examine the effect of technology differences on prices, we impose the same input prices shown in 
Domestic retail prices
Comparable information on domestic retail prices is available for the two jurisdictions. Eurostat reports electricity prices by bands of consumption. 12 We take the 2500-5000KWh per year band as representative of the domestic sector. Average domestic consumption was 4150kWh for all domestic households in GB in 2009 (and 3800kWh/year for households on standard meters, which accounted for more than 80 per cent of total households). 13 In Ireland average consumption for all domestic households was about 5000kWh/year in 2011.
14 To provide electricity to final consumers, suppliers have to pay for the wholesale electricity price, balancing costs, transmission and distribution charges, environmental charges, and the costs they encounter metering and billing electricity usage.
We have already discussed wholesale prices extensively. In this section, we take the hedged price presented in Section 3 as the representative price for Britain. Balancing costs are costs incurred to maintain the reliability of the system. In some instances, for example in the presence of congestion on the transmission lines, the system operator has to deviate from the preset dispatch schedule and constrain some plants on or off. Balancing payments cover the costs of these constraints. In Ireland balancing charges per MWh are determined every year by the CER. For GB, they are published on an hourly basis by National Grid. In order to reach final consumers, electricity has to travel through large transmission and smaller distribution lines.
Environmental costs include the Public Service Obligation in Ireland (although the PSO supports non renewables as well, such as peat plants). In GB they consist of Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) and the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT). Table 5 presents a breakdown of these costs. Balancing costs are averages per unit of final demand.
Transmission, distribution and environmental costs for GB are calculated on the basis of their shares in the overall bill published by Ofgem (2008 Ofgem ( , 2009a Note: Estimates in italics. Domestic price from Eurostat. Simple average of 6-month reported data; Price for band DC (between 2500MWh and 5000MWh consumption yearly), excluding VAT. Breakup of costs: authors' calculations based on OFGEM and CER data. When fixed costs are present, averages taken for a consumer using 3.3 MWh/year.
There are a few aspects of Table 5 that are striking. First of all, retail margins in Great Britain are typically much larger than in Ireland. In light of the findings in the previous section, this is not surprising. Vertically integrated electricity companies are recouping part of the costs they incur generating electricity on the retail market. The net impact on final consumers is a priori unclear.
Vertical integration is likely to decrease wholesale prices, as we saw in this analysis (see also Bushnell et al., 2008 who study US markets). In principle one might also expect large retail margins to encourage new entry into the retail market. However, in practice retailers must build a customer base and find generators willing to sell to them. If this is difficult because most electricity companies are vertically integrated, entry in the retail sector might be limited and average consumer prices might be higher than they need be. For a description of how vertical integration can limit competition, see for example Rey and Tirole (2007) .
The effect of vertical integration in the British market is examined in Giulietti et al. (2010) . They find a substantial impact arising from the strong retail position of integrated firms and cite evidence of large increases in supplier profitability during the time vertical integration developed. Vertical ties had been eliminated at the onset of deregulation in the early 1990s (Wolfram, 1999) . Giulietti et al. (2005) show that incumbent electricity providers maintained significant market power in the residential sector. After liberalisation only a minority of consumers took full advantage of retail competition by switching suppliers, and switching repeatedly (Ipsos Mori, 2013) . Even those who switched did not necessarily move to the cheapest supplier (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2010) . This lead to higher average retail margins for suppliers in GB. Entry with a new integrated firm is unlikely, unless by takeover, due to the effort needed to build a customer base. The overall effect of vertical integration is to protect incumbents from new entry and maintain high profit margins.
The second issue that arises from Table 5 Elaboration of data in Ofgem (2012) shows that the British average was 27 metres per customer. Finally, environmental costs appear to be substantially higher in BETTA than in Ireland even though the penetration of renewables in electricity generation is about half that of Ireland, as shown in Table   6 . In part in reaction to these high costs, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (2012) is moving away from ROCs and adopting feed-in-tariffs.
Future Prices
The wholesale price in Great Britain for the 2008 to 2011 period was probably too low, insufficient to remunerate the long-run marginal cost of generating electricity. This conclusion is similar to that of other studies (Helm, 2009) . The British market needs substantial new investment in generation to continue enjoying a reliable electricity supply over the coming decade. New generation will only take place if investors are confident they will be adequately remunerated. In recent years the move has been in the opposite direction, with natural gas plants being mothballed (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2013).
The Department of Energy and Climate Change (2012) is considering a capacity mechanism to encourage new investment in generation. This would increase final prices.
If we substitute our estimate of long run costs from Table 3 in the calculation of retail margins, we obtain the results shown in Table 7 . was about €16/MWh. Whereas some increase in generator returns might be needed to encourage new investment, it should not be very large given these estimated retail margins. However, while the revenue may be there to finance such new investment, the incentives for the firms may well be to delay such investment, maintaining higher operating profits.
The challenge for GB lies in designing mechanisms that increase returns to generation, and therefore incentives to invest, while limiting retail margins. It is difficult to envisage how this can take place within the current British market structure, with a vertically integrated industry, bilateral contracts and limited regulation. Bilateral contracts do not per se lead to higher prices and are compatible with the EU Target Model. 16 There is, however, some evidence that centralised markets are more efficient. Mansur and White (2012) find that when the Midwest of the US moved away from bilateral markets to join a centralised auction market, trade (and dispatch efficiency) greatly increased.
Whereas a complete analysis of the optimal market design for GB exceeds the scope of this paper, we can make a few comments based on the comparison with SEM. With integrated utilities, volatility in the wholesale market can be hedged within the firm, resulting in a more stable price for consumers. However, this is also possible with a pool where generators and suppliers can also use contracts for difference to hedge price risk for consumers.
When SEM was set up it had three main goals: deliver electricity efficiently, while reducing market power and encouraging entry. These goals have been largely achieved (see Gorecki, 2013 and references cited therein). In the past few years many new thermal plants have been commissioned and new market participants have entered the market (mostly through acquisitions of existing plants). The transparency of the central market design means that it is easy to monitor firms' behaviour and prevent abuses.
Regulation is an important component of the SEM. Centralised pool markets can exhibit market power problems. This was the case with the pool market in England and Wales (Wolfram, 1999) , even after the original incumbents were forced to divest some of their assets (Sweeting, 2007) . When entry is difficult and capacity is limited transparency can increase the incentive to collude, as shown by Kühn (2012) . The conclusion is that even liberalised markets may benefit from strong regulatory oversight.
A second important issue for public policy is the range of mechanisms used to promote renewable generation. In Great Britain the imposition of a Renewables Obligation (ROCs) is significantly more costly than it need be (Helm, 2010) . McIlveen (2010) estimates that the implied carbon price under the scheme is £130 per tonne of carbon dioxide. The commitment to develop large volumes of offshore wind and wave power in the future will be even more expensive. Moreover, the government has recently declared that it has agreed to guarantee the price of a new 3200MW nuclear plant at Hinkley Point for 35 years. The price guarantee would be equal to £92.5 per MWh (€109/MWh at average 2013 exchange rates) for a single nuclear plant, decreasing to £89.5 per MWh (€105/MWh) if an additional nuclear plant is built by EDF. The EU has opened an investigation to determine if the agreement complies with EU rules on state aid.
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Higher levels of wind are also likely to affect the returns on investment of thermal plants, which might be a concern in any market where substantial investment is needed for system reliability (Di Cosmo and Malaguzzi Valeri, 2012) . This affects all jurisdictions, but is especially true in GB, where the worst case scenario for consumers would be a high expenditure on renewable support paired with additional support for thermal plants and a continuing high level of retail margins.
Conclusions
This paper examined the wholesale and retail prices in Ireland and Great Britain. The British market is not price transparent, so the results presented here are approximations of true prices and costs. That said, our findings strongly suggest that wholesale prices in Great Britain are much lower than in Ireland. Differences in prices between the SEM and BETTA are not primarily caused by technological differences. In the Irish case the prices charged on the wholesale market reflect the short-run marginal cost and, taken together with the capacity payments, provide generators with a return approximating their long-run marginal cost of production. Using a model that commits and dispatches generating plants optimally, we show that the wholesale price in Great Britain is not sufficient to cover long run generation costs. The BETTA model is thus not a sustainable long-term model. In fact special provision had to be made to ensure new investment in a nuclear plant at Hinkley Point to maintain sufficient capacity. If new investment is to be incentivised by the market a move to some form of remuneration for capacity seems inevitable.
For GB our analysis suggests that total electricity costs are sufficient (or close to being sufficient) to remunerate all aspects of providing electricity, but currently all the profits are extracted at the retail stage, with high retail margins.
By keeping the wholesale price of electricity below long-run marginal cost incumbents can prevent new entry by generators. Vertically integrated companies use the returns on the retail market in part to finance generation costs. However the incentive to invest in new plant is weak. For existing firms, investing in more generation would reduce the per unit profits they receive. New firms have difficulty entering exclusively at the wholesale level for two main reasons. First, wholesale prices are low and second, it is difficult to build a viable customer base in a market that is dominated by vertically integrated firms.
In the Irish market, by contrast, there has been extensive new entry resulting in significant construction of new thermal generating plants without ad-hoc intervention by the regulatory authorities.
The GB market could (and should) be restructured to allow generators to be fairly remunerated for their costs while simultaneously decreasing retail margins. It is difficult to envisage how this could be achieved without changing a system based on vertically integrated firms, bilateral contracts and limited regulation. However, increasing returns to generators without decreasing retail margins would put an excessive burden on final consumers.
Upward pressure on prices is likely in the future. Both jurisdictions aim to increase the share of renewables in electricity generation and this will increase costs. The cost of supporting renewables per MWh of electricity consumed is, however, much higher in GB, even though renewables account for a smaller share of overall consumption. There is therefore scope to decrease the cost of environmental measures while achieving the same environmental impact. The move in the UK to feed-in tariffs and away from ROCs might help.
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